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William Johnson, the Dog That Did
Not Bark?
Mark R. Killenbeck*
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my
attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
-Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (Adventure XIII), MEMOIRS
OF SHERLOCK HOLMES
The conventional wisdom is that Justice William Johnson, Jr.,
was the "the first dissenter."1 This is not literally true. The first
published opinion of the Court was Georgia v. Brailsford,2 in which
each member of the Court expressed his views seriatim. Ironically, the
first to speak was the first Justice Johnson, Thomas of Maryland, 3
whose reasoning helped create a 4-2 split that produced a number of
Supreme Court firsts: the first published set of opinions, the first split
decision, and the first dissent.
It was the "other" Justice Johnson, William of South Carolina,
who earned the reputation as the first persistently independent voice
Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. I am extremely
grateful to Jim Ely and Mark Brandon for inviting me to participate in this extraordinary
project. Linda Reynolds was tireless in her efforts to make the Symposium a success (and just
generally delightful). Special thanks to Herb Johnson, Chuck Hobson, Tim Huebner, Ron
Rotunda, John Yoo, and Dan Sharfstein for careful readings and extensive comments. Jera
Houghtaling and Janice Bowden Hardaway, Class of 2008, provided superb research assistance.
1. See, e.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER (1954).
The best brief treatment is Herbert A. Johnson, The Constitutional Thought of William Johnson,
89 S.C. HIST. MAG. 132 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, Constitutional Thought].
2. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792). The first published decision included only the Court's
conclusion and no statement of its reasoning. West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791).
3. This was the only opinion Thomas Johnson wrote, one of the realities that prompted
Herb Johnson to observe that "[flew men have so conducted their lives to escape historical study
better than Thomas Johnson of Maryland." Herbert Alan Johnson, Thomas Johnson, in 1 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
95, 96 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House Publishers, 3d ed. 1997).
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on the Court. Johnson was nominated by President Thomas Jefferson
in 1804 and served for thirty years until his death in 1834. The
statistics suggest that Johnson earned his reputation as the first true
contrarian. He wrote over 160 opinions,4 close to one-third of which
were either concurrences (ten) or dissents (thirty-eight).5 This high
ratio set Johnson apart from his brethren, as the next highest number
of recorded separate opinions on the Marshall Court was nine, which
were lodged by Joseph Story.6
I confess that it was Johnson's pronounced independence that
prompted me to select him as my subject. When John G. Roberts, Jr.,
was in the midst of his second Term as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, having succeeded his mentor William H.
Rehnquist, the new Chief Justice made it clear that one of his goals
was to promote unanimity on the bench, observing: "I think that every
[Jiustice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they're
writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution."7
Roberts gleaned that imperative from the record of the only individual
to become Chief Justice at a younger age than he:
If the Court in Marshall's era had issued decisions in important cases the way this
Court has over the past thirty years, we would not have a Supreme Court today of the
sort that we have. ... That suggests that what the Court's been doing over the past
thirty years has been eroding, to some extent, the capital that Marshall built up .... I
think the Court is also ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution,
because if it doesn't, it's going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an institution.8
The Chief Justice's statement highlights that the Court has departed
with increasing frequency from the perspective expressed by Chief
Justice William Howard Taft that "[m]ost dissents ... are a form of
egotism," and "[i]t is much more important what the Court thinks
4. Johnson trailed only John Marshall and Joseph Story in terms of overall productivity.
Morgan sets the number of Johnson opinions at 167. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 306-07. Professor
VanBurkleo claims that the actual number is 162. Sandra F. VanBurkleo, In Defense of "Public
Reason". Supreme Court Justice William Johnson, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 115, 119 (2007).
5. VanBurkleo, supra note 4, at 119. Morgan claims twenty-one concurrences and thirty-
two dissents. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 306-07.
6. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 306-07. Story should be second for two reasons: his period
of service (1806-1823), which tracked closely to that of Johnson, and the fact that the actual next
highest number, twelve dissents from 1830 to 1832, were filed by Henry Baldwin, an individual
who "steered his own rather eccentric course through the law, its inconsistencies caused in part
by his insistence upon his peculiar approach to constitutional adjudication and in part by
periodic attacks of insanity." HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL,
1801-1835, at 49 (1997) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MARSHALL].
7. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA 8 (2007).
8. Id. at 7-8.
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than what any one thinks."9 It remains to be seen if Roberts will enjoy
meaningful success. The ebb and flow has been uneven, 10 and it is far
from clear whether the Roberts Court will be noted for its harmony,
much less its unanimity.11 That said, his comments suggest that,
while dissent is in the air, it is decidedly out of favor.
Ironically, the collegial norm offered by Chief Justice Roberts
and other critics is the Marshall Court, 12 on which William Johnson
supposedly fought his battle to establish the principle that each
member of the Court should feel free to state his individual views, be
they expressions of concurrence or dissent. Yet the more I learned
about Johnson, the more troubled I became with his label: dissenter.
First, I believe that Johnson's role in establishing the principle of an
independent voice, while important, is generally overstated. Second, I
believe that when we focus on Johnson we should concentrate on what
he did not say rather than what he did. It is in this respect that I see
him as the judicial dog that did not bark, at least on those occasions
when he might most have been expected to.
I.
William Johnson, Jr., was the second son and favored child of a
South Carolina blacksmith who played an active part in that state's
resistance to the abuses of British rule. 13 The younger Johnson was
born on December 27, 1771, and received a sound classical education,
eventually graduating first in his class in September 1790 from the
College of New Jersey, which is now Princeton University. Johnson
9. Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (Dec. 26, 1921), quoted in
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1311 (2001).
10. During Chief Justice Rehnquist's final Term, the Court issued seventy-nine full
opinions, twenty-four of which were unanimous (30.4%). The Statistics, Table I(C) (Unanimity),
119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 423 (2005). In its first year under Roberts, the Court issued eighty-one
opinions, thirty-six of which were unanimous (44.4%). The Statistics, Table I(C) (Unanimity), 120
HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2006).
11. Compare Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50
(characterizing the October 2006 Term as "the stormiest in recent memory, with more 5-to-4
decisions split along ideological lines than at any time in the court's history"), with Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo: in Latest Term, Majority Grows to More Than 5 of the
Justices, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at 1 (noting that up to that point in the October 2007 Term
there had been only one 5-4 decision).
12. See, e.g., Michael W. Schwartz, Our Fractured Supreme Court: The Benefit of Unanimity
and the Vanity of Dissent, 147 POL'Y REV. 3, 9 (2008) ("Chief Justice Roberts' unusual public
campaign for unanimity involves much more than a nostalgic yearning for the halcyon days of
John Marshall.").
13. This brief summary of Johnson's upbringing and early career is taken from various
sources, in particular MORGAN, supra note 1, at 3-22.
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then read law under the tutelage of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a
South Carolina lawyer and Federalist leader who played an active role
in the Constitutional Convention, pressing the need for a strong
national government. 14
Johnson was admitted to the bar in 1793 but, like so many of
his generation and background, was not content simply to practice
law. He entered politics, nominally as a Republican, and was elected
to the South Carolina House of Representatives in October 1794. One
early biographer characterized Johnson as "having attached himself
warmly to that republican party which, under the lead of Mr.
Jefferson, was growing fast and strong throughout the Union, and
which in South Carolina... [was] sustained by most of the youthful
talent of the State. ' 15 That is almost certainly an oversimplification.
The political situation in South Carolina was complicated, with strong
support for Jefferson and the Republicans in "the distant interior of
the state" offset by substantial support for a strong national
government, especially in Charleston. 16 Johnson, for example, joined
the Republican majority in the South Carolina House in condemning
the Jay Treaty. 17 But in other instances, particularly on the bench, he
would espouse positions at odds with Republican orthodoxy.
Johnson served three terms in the House, from 1794 through
1799. His colleagues then placed him on the Court of Common Pleas, a
posting that carried with it a seat on the state's highest appellate
tribunal, the Constitutional Court. The latter appointment proved
especially important as it instilled in Johnson a familiarity with and
appreciation for the practice of allowing individual judges to express
their own positions in the cases they heard.
Johnson came to Jefferson's attention in February 1804 when
Justice Alfred Moore resigned due to ill health. Moore's resignation
offered Jefferson the opportunity to install someone who was neither a
Federalist nor appointed by a Federalist President. That was clearly a
matter of considerable importance. The third President did declare
famously in his first inaugural address that "every difference of
14. See generally MARTY D. MATTHEWS, FORGOTTEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
CHARLES PINCKNEY (2004).
15. JOHN BELTON ONEALL, William Johnson, in 1 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH
AND BAR OF SOUTH CAROLINA 72, 73 (1859).
16. Ulrich B. Phillips, The South Carolina Federalists, 1, 14 AM. HIST. REV. 529, 542 (1909).
Phillips attributes this to a combination of the recognition "that commerce depended upon
efficient government" and the national political ambitions of local leaders. Id.
17. The Jay Treaty was an important step in averting a possible war with Great Britain
and resolved a number of issues. It was nevertheless intensely controversial and vehemently
denounced by the Jeffersonians. See generally JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL
BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970).
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opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different
names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are
all Federalists."18 But those putatively conciliatory sentiments did not
encompass John Marshall and the Court. A mere ten days later,
Jefferson complained that the Federalists "have retreated into the
judiciary as a stronghold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to
dislodge them."'19 In December 1801 he repeated the sentiment,
arguing:
There the remains of federalism are to be preserved ... and from that battery all the
works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased. By a fraudulent use of the
Constitution, which has made the judges irremovable, they have multiplied useless
judges merely to strengthen their phalanx.
20
Jefferson had any number of reasons for being angry with the
Federalists, not the least of which was that John Adams had
appointed the so-called "midnight judges" in the waning days of his
presidency. This was compounded by the fact that one of the
beneficiaries was John Marshall. Jefferson recognized the power of
Marshall's intellect and his persuasive abilities. But Marshall's sheer
ability made Jefferson uneasy, for, as Story reported, he felt:
When conversing with Marshall, I never admit anything. So sure as you admit any
position to be good, no matter how remote from the conclusion he seeks to establish, you
are gone. So great is his sophistry, you must never give him an affirmative answer, or
you will be forced to grant his conclusion. Why, if he were to ask me whether it were
daylight or not, I'd reply, "Sir, I do not know, I can't tell."
2 1
Jefferson found Marshall's habits and politics equally distasteful. He
condemned Marshall's "lax and lounging manners [which] have made
him popular with the bulk of the people in Richmond, and a profound
hypocrisy with many thinking men in our country. '22 The two were
frequently on opposite sides regarding many of the great political
questions of the day. In the early 1790s, for example, they clashed
over the manner in which the new nation should respond to the
18. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 309, 310 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)
[hereinafter RICHARDSON].
19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (Mar. 14, 1801), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 222, 223 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON, WRITINGS].
20. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Dec. 19, 1801), in 10 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 301, 302.
21. Diary Entry of Rutherford B. Hayes (Sept. 20, 1843), in 1 DIARY AND LETTERS OF
RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES 115, 116 (Charles Richard Williams ed., 1922) (quoting a lecture
by Justice Story at Harvard Law School).
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1795), in 16 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 134, 134 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989).
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revolution in France, an episode that prompted Jefferson to complain
to Madison (with ironic and mistaken insight) that it might be best to
put Marshall where he could do less harm, as "nothing better could be
done than to make him a judge."
23
Marshall's criticisms of Jefferson did not help. In January 1801
the defeat of John Adams was certain, but the actual winner of the
recent presidential election was still in doubt. Marshall voiced a
preference for Aaron Burr, informing Alexander Hamilton that he had
"almost insuperable objections" to Jefferson, whose French "prejudices
seem ... totally to unfit him for the. chief magistracy of a nation which
cannot indulge those prejudices without sustaining debt & permanent
injury."24 Two years later, Marshall added insult to injury with his
opinion in Marbury v. Madison.25 The decision was nominally a victory
for a President who would not be obliged to deliver Marbury's
commission. But Jefferson was incensed that Marshall and his
colleagues, "in the outset, [having] disclaimed all cognizance of the
case.., then went on to say what would have been their opinion," a
"gratuitous" exercise that constituted "an extrajudicial opinion and, as
such, of no authority."26
Jefferson treated Alfred Moore's resignation as a welcome
opportunity to reshape the Court. He solicited the advice of Secretary
of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, who observed that "[t]he importance
of filling this vacancy with a Republican and a man of sufficient
talents to be useful, is obvious, but the task is difficult."27 The main
problem was geographic balance. Gallatin noted that, with Moore
gone, two of the six judicial circuits were not represented on the
Court. 28 He suggested that if the nominee were to be taken from "the
Second District, Brockholst Livingston is certainly first in point of
talents."29 But in part because Moore was from North Carolina,
23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 333, 333 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds, 1983).
24. Letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 1, 1801), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 290, 290 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977). Ironically, Hamilton covertly
provided key assistance in seeing that Jefferson, rather than Burr, became President. See RON
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 631-35 (2004).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1807), in 11 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 213, 215.
27. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 15, 1804), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
ALBERT GALLATIN 177, 178 (Henry Adams ed., 1879).
28. Id. ("As there are now two circuits without a presiding Judge (the circuits of Virginia
and North Carolina having yet two), the person may be taken from either.").




Jefferson looked to the South for his first nominee. Gallatin steered
him to South Carolina, observing that "I am told that the practice is as
loose in Georgia as in New England and that a real lawyer could not
easily be found there. But South Carolina stands high in that respect,
at least in reputation."30 Five possible nominees were suggested by
two South Carolinians, Senator Thomas Sumter and Representative
Wade Hampton. 31 One was William Johnson, described as "a state
judge, an excellent lawyer, prompt, eloquent, of irreproachable
character, republican connections, and of good nerves in his political
principles about 35 years old. was speaker some years."3
2
That assessment was accurate, to a point. Johnson clearly had
earned the respect of many of his colleagues, who had made him
speaker of the South Carolina House and had elevated him to the
state bench. But Johnson also had what might charitably be described
as certain personality quirks, some of which served him well but
others of which ultimately limited his effectiveness. John Quincy
Adams described the Johnson who served on the Court as "a man of
considerable talents and law knowledge."3 3 Indeed, he characterized
him as a "learned man [who] defends his opinions with so much
earnestness and vigor" that, during one debate between the two,
Adams found it "advisable, after some discussion, to waive the
subject."3 4 But Johnson's conduct both on and off the bench compelled
Adams to conclude that, while intelligent and accomplished, Johnson
ultimately proved "a restless, turbulent, hot-headed, politician
caballing judge."3
5
The message nominating Johnson to the Supreme Court was
received by the Senate on March 22, 1804, with confirmation following
two days later. Secretary of State James Madison then informed
Johnson of the President's decision and asked if he would accept the
position. 36 Johnson's biographer Donald Morgan is perhaps overly
30. Id.
31. Memorandum from Thomas Sumter and Wade Hampton to Thomas Jefferson,
Characters of the Lawyers of S. C. (Feb. 17, 1804), in Gaillard Hunt, Office-Seeking During
Jefferson's Administration, 3 AM. HIST. REV. 270, 282 (1898).
32. Id.
33. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Mar. 27, 1820), in 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS 39, 43 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875) [hereinafter ADAMS, MEMOIRS].
34. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Sept. 2, 1818), in 4 ADAMS, MEMOIRS, supra note
33, at 128, 129.
35. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Mar. 27, 1820), in 5 ADAMS, MEMOIRS (Mar. 27,
1820), supra note 33, at 39, 43.
36. 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 79, 79 n.1 (David B.
Mattern et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter MADISON, SEC'Y STATE] (referencing Madison's letter of
Mar. 31, 1804 and noting that it "has not been found").
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dramatic in his description of what followed, but his characterization
of the events is worth repeating:
Toward the middle of April this communication overtook the rising young state judge in
the midst of his state activities, judicial and otherwise. Would he accept? Or would he,
like his mentor C. C. Pinckney before him, turn it down out of preference for a local
career? He was doubtless aware of the struggle over the federal judiciary, then at its
height, and of the difficulties he would encounter there. He would occupy an outpost on
the front and would be called on, in the interest of Republicanism, to resist single-
handed the aggressions of Marshall and the Federalists.
3 7
Johnson himself did not seem terribly troubled by what lay ahead. He
wrote Madison on April 18, 1804, conveying "my Acknowledgments to
the President for this Mark of Attention and Confidence, & to
communicate my willingness to accept the Appointment. ' 38 He asked
only that he be given "until the 1st May next" to complete certain local
duties and obligations.3 9 There were apparently no objections, and
Johnson took his judicial oath on May 7, 1804.40 The supposedly
Republican cat had accordingly been set among the Federalist
canaries.
II.
It is difficult to reconstruct with certainty-or at least risky to
pretend to do so-what actually took place when Johnson joined the
Court for its February 1805 Term. William Cranch, the reporter at the
time,4' first notes Johnson's presence at a session of the Court on
February 15, 1805, when arguments began in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's
Lessee.42 Cranch claims that M'Ilvane "was the first case decided in
37. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 51. Washington offered the seat vacated by the resignation of
John Rutledge jointly to Pinckney and Edward Rutledge. Letter from George Washington to
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Edward Rutledge (May 24, 1791), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 725, 725-26 (Maeva
Marcus et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. They declined. Letter from
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Edward Rutledge to George Washington (June 12, 1791), in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 727, 727-28.
38. Letter from William Johnson to James Madison (Apr. 18, 1804), in 7 MADISON, SEC'Y
STATE, supra note 36, at 78, 78.
39. Id.
40. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
41. Cranch was not up to the task. Frequent inconsistencies in his reporting, coupled with
his inability to publish the reports in a timely manner, eventually cost him his position. Cranch's
life and service as Reporter are discussed in Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court
Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendency, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291,
1306-12 (1985).
42. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 280 n.t (1805).
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February Term, 1805."43 The description is inaccurate in one
important respect, as the Court actually reserved judgment at the
conclusion of oral argument and did not reach a decision until
February 1808. 44 But the possibility that M'Ilvane and what was in
effect a companion case, Lambert's Lessee v. Paine,45 were the first in
which Johnson participated is intriguing. John Marshall "did not sit in
[either] cause, having formed a decided opinion on the principal
question, while his interest was concerned." 46 As a result, both
Lambert's Lessee and eventually M'Ilvane were resolved with the
Court issuing seriatim opinions, as was its wont when Marshall was
not present.
This approach likely struck a responsive yet bittersweet chord
with Johnson, who many years later informed Jefferson:
While I was on our state-bench I was accustomed to delivering seriatim opinions in our
appellate court, and was not a little surprised to find our Chief Justice in the Supreme
Court delivering all the opinions in cases in which he sat, even in some instances when
contrary to his own judgment and vote.
4 7
This letter has been one of the primary exhibits in fashioning what
has for many years been a key claim about the Marshall Court: that
the manner in which it conducted its business stood in stark contrast
to the approach taken prior to Marshall's arrival.
A substantial number of individuals have embraced the view
that Marshall "dispensed with the Supreme Court's customary
practice of seriatim opinions."48 Morgan, agreeing with the traditional
position, paints a particularly grim picture regarding the situation
Johnson found when he arrived at the Court:
43. Id. at 336 n.*.
44. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808).
45. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97 (1805).
46. 6 U.S. at 280 n.t. M'Ilvane involved the seizure of loyalist lands by the state of New
Jersey. Marshall disqualified himself, given his interests in the Fairfax lands in Virginia and his
involvement in the litigation surrounding them.
47. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in Donald G.
Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 369 (1953) [hereinafter,
respectively, Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, and Morgan, Origin]. To my knowledge, no complete copy
of this letter has been published. It is, however, available online in the Thomas Jefferson papers
section of the American Memory site maintained by the Library of Congress,
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mtj:6:./temp/-ammem-16FS:: (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
48. VanBurkleo, supra note 4, at 121; see also Editorial Note: The Supreme Court, in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS, AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS
NOVEMBER 1800-MARCH 1807, at 69, 70 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990) [hereinafter MARSHALL,
PAPERS] ("The most immediate and obvious change that Marshall instituted was the
abandonment of seriatim opinions in favor of a single 'opinion of the court,' usually pronounced
by the chief justice."); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 432
(1986) ("Until John Marshall became Chief Justice, the Court followed the custom of the King's
Bench and announced its decisions through the seriatim opinions of its members.").
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Johnson now faced formidable hurdles. At the time when he entered the courtroom in
Washington he was but one against five .... Moreover, the rule of unanimity, now so
firmly fixed, and the virtual monopoly of expression which had drifted into Marshall's
hands would set up serious obstacles to the voicing of Republican sentiments. Although
Johnson parted company with the others in his conception of sound political principle,
he had to contend with the smothering effect of Marshall's practices of opinion-giving.
Johnson was in an unenviable position in 1805.
49
The actual record is much more complicated. Marshall did in
his early years announce virtually all of the Court's opinions, routinely
using the formulation employed in the first reported case in which he
participated, Talbot v. Seeman, where "Marshall, Chief Justice,
delivered the opinion of the court."50 It is simply not the case, however,
that this approach originated with Marshall. Systemic change-if
indeed there actually was any change-actually began when
Ellsworth became Chief Justice, and the Court acceded to his
preference for a brief majority opinion.51 It is also clear that the
Justices were willing to speak individually, and at length, in what
generally are recognized as the major pre-Marshall cases,52 belying
the claim that "[blefore Justice William Johnson ascended the
Supreme Court bench the dissenting opinion was seldom more than a
feeble finger of protest. 53
Jefferson was, therefore, simply wrong when he complained
that it was Marshall, and Marshall alone, who was responsible for the
departure from "the sound practice of the primitive court. '54 That said,
we are left with the whys and wherefores of Johnson's actual practices
once he took his seat, a course of conduct that would have him write
49. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 53.
50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 26 (1801).
51. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 110 (1995) ("Before Ellsworth became Chief
Justice, the Court had not developed a firm tradition regarding the use of seriatim or majority
opinions."); John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 139 (1999) ("[Mlany of the Court's practices during these
[early] years were unsettled."); see also Natalie Wexler, In the Beginning: The First Three Chief
Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1413 (2006) ("[A] study of the Supreme Court's reported
decisions in the 1790s reveals that Marshall only solidified the transition from seriatim opinions
to opinions of the Court; he did not introduce the idea.").
52. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256-284 (1796), for example, Justice Iredell felt
so strongly about the correctness of his opinion below that, while technically not sitting in the
case, he nevertheless in effect lodged a dissent by reading his prior opinion into the record. In
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), each Justice spoke seriatim and Justice Iredell's
dissent was subsequently vindicated with the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. Ware is
also famous as the only case John Marshall argued before the Court. He lost.
53. A.J. Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MICH. L. REV. 497, 512
(1944).
54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 15 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 451.
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what was, at least compared to his colleagues, an extraordinary
number of concurring and dissenting opinions.
III.
One of Marshall's innovations was the custom of having the
Justices live together in a boardinghouse during the few weeks they
were in Washington when the Court was in session. Marshall believed
this was one of the most important aspects of how the Court went
about its business. As Ted White has stressed: "Under Marshall the
boardinghouse setting became an integral part of the Court's working
pattern."5
5
One key objective was to foster unanimity, which Marshall
made quite clear in May 1831 as new appointments to the Court,
particularly that of Henry Baldwin, threatened to end the practice. In
a letter to Story, Marshall complained that "the revolutionary spirit
which displayed itself in our circle will like most other revolutions,
work inconvenience and mischief in its progress," 56 offering as
evidence the apparent collapse of the common living arrangement in
the wake of the decision of "our younger brother," Baldwin, to lodge
with "some other person."57 He then speculated about the potential
impact of this development on decision practices, stating: "I think this
is a matter of some importance, for if the Judges scatter ad libitum the
docket, I fear, will remain quite compact, losing very few of its causes;
and the few it may lose will probably be carried by seriatim
opinions."5
8
We do not know precisely when William Johnson arrived in
Washington or first met John Marshall. The circumstances and his
feelings about them were presumably much like those Story
experienced when he joined the Court in February 1812. "We live very
harmoniously and familiarly," Story wrote, and "moot questions as
they are argued, with freedom, and derive no inconsiderable
advantage from the pleasant and animated interchange of legal
acumen."59 The brethren, Story observed, "are very interesting men"
55. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 190
(1988) [hereinafter WHITE, MARSHALL COURT]. For a more detailed discussion, see G. Edward
White, Imagining the Marshall Court, 1986 Y.B SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 77.
56. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 3, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 62, 62.
57. Id. at 63.
58. Id.
59. Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Feb. 16, 1812), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS
OF JOSEPH STORY 213, 214 (William W. Story ed., 1851) [hereinafter STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS].
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and "live in the most frank and unaffected intimacy. . . . united as
one, with a mutual esteem which makes even the labors of
Jurisprudence light."60 The boardinghouse arrangement, in turn,
fostered a shared approach to decisionmaking. The "conferences at our
lodgings often come to a very quick, and, I trust, a very accurate
opinion, in a few hours."
6'
It is highly likely that William Johnson had been instructed in
the collegial ways of the Court prior to taking his seat on the bench.
As part of that communal process, he would have learned, assuming
he did not already know from reading recent decisions, that the
practice was for John Marshall, in virtually every case decided, to
deliver "the opinion of the Court.' 62 Johnson took issue with this
custom. In the same letter in which he confessed his "surprise" on
learning of this approach, he declared: "I remonstrated in vain; the
answer was, he is willing to take the trouble, and it is a mark of
respect to him.
'63
The first indication that Johnson would not go along came on
February 27, 1805, in Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass.64 Marshall
spoke for the Court, which sided with a group of speculators and
overruled the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the
operative state statute. 65 Johnson filed a concurring opinion,
indicating that "there was a question suggested and commented on in
the argument which has not been noticed by the court, but which
appears to me to merit some consideration." 66 Johnson was silent the
next Term, but he lodged two firsts in February 1807. He delivered his
first opinion for the Court in Marshall v. Currie,67 a truly forgettable
land dispute from Kentucky that the Court resolved in part .by parsing
the significance of initials scored into the trunks of trees. 68 He also
60. Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 24, 1812), in 1 STORY, LIFE AND
LETTERS, supra note 59, at 215, 215.
61. Id. at 215-16.
62. See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 340 (1805) ("Marshall, Ch. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.").
63. Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, supra note 47, at 369.
64. 7 U.S. (2 Cranch) 1 (1805).
65. For a discussion of the case and its significance, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 212-22 (2001).
66. Huidekoper's Lessee, 7 U.S. at 72 (Johnson, J., concurring). This was actually one of two
separate opinions filed that Term. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805)
(statement of Washington, J.) (implicitly dissenting by "declaring the reasons which induced the
circuit court ... to pronounce the opinion which is to be re.examined here").
67. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 172 (1807).
68. See id, at 176 (discussing "the impression of a certain mark upon such a tree").
418 [Vol. 62:2:407
WILLL4M JOHNSON
authored the first of his dissents in Ex parte Bollman and Ex parte
Swartwout,69 which grew out of the Burr conspiracy trial.
Marshall wrote for the Court. He held that it had the power to
issue the writs of habeas corpus in question, arguing that "the sound
construction" of the provision in the Judiciary Act involved "is, that
the true sense of the words is to be determined by the nature of the
provision, and by the context," rather than a "strict grammatical
construction."70 Johnson disagreed, arguing at some length that the
Court "can exercise appellate jurisdiction in no case, unless expressly
authorised to do so by the laws of congress."71 He made it clear that he
spoke reluctantly but with a sense of duty, beginning with the
declaration that "[i]n this case, I have the misfortune to dissent from
the majority of my brethren,"72 and ending by describing "the painful
sensation resulting from the necessity of dissenting from the majority
of the court."7 3 Nevertheless, "[a]s it is a case of much interest, I feel it
incumbent upon me to assign the reasons upon which I adopt [my
contrary] opinion."
74
Johnson subsequently recounted his version of what happened
in the wake of his dissent:
Some case soon occurred, in which I differed from my brethren, & I thought it a thing of
course to deliver my opinion. But, during the rest of the session I heard nothing but
lectures on the indecency of judges cutting at each other, and the loss of reputation
which the Virginia appellate courts had sustained by pursuing such a course. At length I
found that I must either submit to circumstances or become a cypher in our
consultations as to effect no good at all. I therefore bent to the current, and persevered
until I got them to adopt the course they now pursue, which is to appoint someone to
deliver the opinion of the majority, but leave it to the discretion of the rest of the Judges
to record their opinions or not ad libitum.
75
A number of things are worth noting. If, for example, Johnson
"bent to the current," it was for a remarkably short time: during the
next three Terms, he wrote six concurring opinions and six dissents.
More importantly, Johnson was not alone in his inclination to concur
or dissent. For example, Justice Bushrod Washington wrote what was
in effect a dissent during Johnson's first Term on the Court.7 6
69. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
70. Id. at 95.
71. Id. at 103 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 101.
73. Id. at 107.
74. Id. at 101. Johnson, referring to Chase, who was ill and could not participate, stressed
that he was "relieved... in being supported by the opinion of one of my brethren, who is
prevented by indisposition from attending." Id. at 107.
75. Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, supra note 47, at 369.
76. In United States v. Fisher, Justice Washington, while technically not participating by
virtue of being one of the ruling judges below, implicitly dissented by "declaring the reasons
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Brockholst Livingston, the second of three Jeffersonian Justices,
joined the Court in 1807 and wrote a number of separate opinions in
each of the three Terms from 1808 through 1810. 77 John Marshall
found himself forced to dissent in 1810.78 Even Thomas Todd, the
third and final Jeffersonian, who came on board in May 1807 and
wrote only fourteen opinions during his nineteen years on the Court,
signaled a willingness to dissent.79 Thus, while Johnson may have set
the standard for "cutting at each other," he was hardly alone.
Concurring and dissenting opinions on the early Marshall Court may
have been infrequent, at least by modern standards. But they were
filed, and not just by William Johnson.
Johnson's claim that he 'got [the Court] to adopt" a revised
practice is also troubling. The Court did not sit in 1811, a combination
of illnesses and vacancies having prevented it from assembling a
quorum. When it reconvened in February of 1812, it had two new
members, Joseph Story and Gabriel Duvall, who were placed on the
Court by James Madison. Their appointments set the membership of
the Marshall Court for the next eleven years and ten months, the
longest continuous period of service for a single group of Justices in
the Court's history. It also eliminated one possible factor in Marshall's
calculations regarding how the Court should conduct its business: the
need to accommodate the shortcomings of certain of its members. This
is not to say that Duvall or, for that matter, Todd were shining judicial
stars. They were not. It is clear, however, that the core of the Court-
Marshall, Washington, Johnson, Livingston, and Story-was sound,
and Marshall could count on the dedicated services of four Justices
who were up to the tasks before them.
Johnson discussed these matters in his characteristically blunt
style when he informed Jefferson of "the real cause" of Marshall's
"opinion of the court" practice: "Cushing was incompetent, Chase could
not be got to think or write-Patterson was a slow man and willingly
declined the trouble, and the other two judges you know are commonly
estimated as one judge."80 There is obviously ample room to disagree
which induced the circuit court ... to pronounce the opinion which is to be re-examined here." 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805).
77. See, e.g., Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 323 (1810) (Livingston,
J., concurring); Hepburn v. Auld, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 262, 278-80 (1809) (Livingston, J., concurring
and dissenting); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 281-82 (1808) (Livingston, J.,
concurring); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 298 (1808) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
78. Hudson & Smith v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281, 285 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
79. Although he did not speak or write an opinion at the time, Todd subsequently
announced that he agreed with Johnson's dissent in Rose. See Hudson, 10 U.S. at 285 n.*.
80. Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, supra note 47, at 369.
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with his assessments of Chase and Washington.81 Patterson's health
had been an issue, however, for many years and was a major factor in
Adams's refusal to consider him for Chief Justice when Ellsworth
resigned. Cushing's age and infirmities, in turn, caught up with him
during the period in question.
There is, therefore, at least a partial ring of truth in Johnson's
observations, and these realities likely influenced Marshall's
assessment of how best to distribute the workload prior to 1812. A
second consideration was the number of cases coming before the
Court. Marshall's willingness and ability to write virtually every
opinion during his initial years on the bench almost certainly reflected
the fact that there were not that many cases on the docket. In 1801,
for example, Marshall's first Term on the Court, he wrote four
opinions; in 1803, the Court not having sat in 1802, he wrote twelve;
and in 1804, eight.8 2 But from 1805, the year Johnson arrived, and
especially after 1812, the docket expanded steadily to the point that it
would be rare for the Marshall Court to hear and decide fewer than
thirty cases.8
3
I deliberately left one final consideration, arguably the most
important one, for last in my assessment of Marshall's policies and
Johnson's responses. In the final years of his life, Jefferson complained
bitterly and often about Marshall and the Court. This does not imply
that he was silent while President or, for that matter, in his early
retirement years. Marshall angered Jefferson repeatedly, prompting
him to complain to Madison that "[h]is twistifications of the law in the
case of Marbury, in that of Burr, & the late Yazoo case shew how
dexterously he can reconcile law to his personal biasses."
8 4
These early criticisms were nevertheless mild compared to
those lodged after landmark opinions like M'Culloch v. Maryland8 5
and Cohens v. Virginia.86 Both, notably, were unanimous, and both
bolstered the authority of the national government at the expense of
the states. They therefore represented all that Jefferson abhorred
about the Court, from its conception of its role to its interpretation of
81. See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson, Bushrod Washington, 62 VAND. L. REV. 447 (2009);
Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against the Jeffersonians,
62 VAND. L. REV. 349 (2009).
82. See 6 MARSHALL, PAPERS, supra note 48, at 538-39.
83. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 306-07 (finding that from 1812 through 1833, the lowest
number of cases was twenty in both 1820 and 1825).
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1810), in 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 139, 141 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, WORKS].
85. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
86. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
2009]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the Constitution. And in their wake, Jefferson became increasingly
vocal and began for the first time to harp on the extent to which
individual Justices "hid" behind Marshall's voice and persona.
A typical, but by no means isolated, example came in December
1820 when Jefferson complained that "[t]he judiciary of the United
States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working
under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated
republic."8 7 It was not just the results that he objected to: "An opinion
is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if
unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid
associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his
mind, by the turn of his own reasoning."
883
Jefferson renewed the assault in October 1822 in a letter to
Johnson that attempted to enlist the services of his first nominee in
his battle against Marshall. Jefferson alleged, incorrectly, that "the
seriatim opinions ... in the supreme Court of the US . . . . continued I
know to the end of the 3d Dallas in 1800," that is, to approximately
"that time the present C.J. came to the bench."8 9 This was
unfortunate, he maintained, as:
Some of these cases too have been of such importance, of such difficulty, and the
decisions so grating to a portion of the public as to have merited the fullest explanation
from every judge seriatim, of the reasons which had produced such convictions on his
mind. It was interesting to the public to know whether these decisions were really
unanimous, or might not perhaps be of 4. against 3. and consequently prevailing by the
preponderance of one voice only.
9 0
This deprived the nation of its only remedies against the members of
the Court, "[i]mpeachment" and "[i]ndividual reputation," as the
"practice compleatly withdraws them from both. For nobody knows
what opinion any individual gave in any case, nor even that he who
delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself."91 Jefferson also
maintained that "[t]he practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the
modest & the incompetent. ' 92
Johnson's reply included revelations about his experiences
when he joined the Court and various claims about how he "fought the
good fight," eventually persuading his brethren to designate a single
87. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 175, 177.
88. Id. at 177-78.
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 246, 249.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 249-50.
92. Id. at 250.
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Justice to deliver the opinion of the Court while leaving the others free
to write separately if they wished. He did not, however, accede to the
notion that seriatim opinions should be the norm. Rather, he
suggested that the appropriate way to deal with Jefferson's complaints
was to reduce the size of the Court and provided a brief outline of the
reforms he had in mind.93 Jefferson was not mollified and renewed his
assault in March 1823, expressing his "hope that the judges will see
the importance and the duty of giving their country the only evidence
they can of fidelity to its constitution and integrity in the
administration of its laws ... by every one's giving his opinions
seriatim and publicly on the cases he decides.
'94
Jefferson achieved partial success. In April 1823, perhaps worn
down by Jefferson's barrage of words, Johnson informed his patron
that "[o]n the subject of seriatim opinions in the Supreme Court I have
thought much, and have come to the resolution'to adopt your
suggestion on all subjects of general interest; particularly
constitutional questions. On minor subjects it is of little public
importance."95 He did not, however, resurrect the practice of seriatim
opinions. Rather, he simply continued his past practice of writing
concurring and dissenting opinions.9 6
Johnson did not retreat from two important principles. One,
discussed in the next Section, was his support for some of the most
important constitutional doctrines articulated by the Marshall Court,
particularly its embrace of implied powers and the supremacy of the
federal government within certain spheres. The other was his
agreement with Marshall that it was important for the Court,
wherever possible, to speak with a strong, clear voice.
It is worth recalling that Marshall had very good reasons for
acting as he did when he became Chief Justice. The pre-Marshall
Court was a distant third in the federal hierarchy, a judicial
backwater that commanded scant respect and had only an occasional
impact on national affairs. John Jay expressed the sentiments of many
of his contemporaries when he refused to return to the Court for a
second stint as Chief Justice:
93. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in MORGAN,
supra note 1, at 182-83 & n.64.
94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Mar. 4, 1823), in 15 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 419, 422.
95. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 11, 1823), in 1 S.C. HIST. &
GENEALOGICAL MAG. 206, 210 (1900) [hereinafter Johnson, Apr. 11 Letter].
96. Morgan, for example, has Johnson issuing twelve concurrences and fourteen dissents
from 1805 through 1821, compared to nine concurrences and eighteen dissents from 1823 until
his death in 1834. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 306-07.
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I left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a System so defective, it would not obtain
the Energy weight and Dignity which are essential to its affording due support to the
national Governmt; nor acquire the public Confidence and Respect, which, as the last
Resort of Justice of the nation, it should possess. Hence I am induced to doubt both the
Propriety and Expediency of my returning to the Bench under the present System,
especially as is would give some Countenance to the neglect and Indifference with which
the opinions & Remonstrances of the Judges on this important Subject have been
treated.
9 7
Jefferson and his allies were at least partially responsible for
the low esteem in which the Court was held. William Duane, the
strong Jeffersonian editor of the influential newspaper, the Aurora,
expressed the Jeffersonians' views when it appeared that Jay might
get the appointment:
John Jay after having thro' decay of age become incompetent to discharge the duties of
Governor, has been appointed to the sinecure of Chief Justice of the United States.
That the Chief Justiceship is a sinecure needs no other evidence, than that in one case
the duties were discharged by one person who resided at the same time in England; and
by another during a year's residence in France.
9 8
Marshall's determination to make the Court a strong, effective,
and coequal branch was therefore understandable. One key aspect of
his approach was to have the Court speak with a single voice. In one of
his anonymous, post-decision essays defending M'Culloch, for
example, Marshall argued:
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion which is to be
delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously submitted to the consideration of the
judges; and, if any part of the reasoning be disproved, it must be modified as to receive
the approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the opinion of all.
And, as the Cohens controversy unfolded, he observed to Story, "The
harmony of the bench will, I hope & pray, never be disturbed. We have
external & political enemies enough to preserve internal peace."99
Johnson shared these views. He was, admittedly, determined
"to avoid having an ambiguous decision hereafter imputed to me, or an
opinion which I would not wish to be understood to have given." 100 He
therefore reserved the right to voice his own opinions occasionally. But
he also sought to strengthen the Court:
97. Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Jan. 2, 1801), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 37, at 146, 146-47.
98. Editorial, PHILA. AURORA & GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 8, 1801, at 2.
99. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 13, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 178, 179.
100. Marine Insurance Company v. Young, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 187, 191 (1809) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). Johnson's statement is found on the Errata page. Id. at viii (having been "mislaid
and omitted to be inserted in its proper place.").
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One thing, however, I resolved on at a very early period-to let no private or party
feeling run counter to the great interests of the United States. If an executive, a
legislative and judicial department are necessary to the well-being of the community, it
behooves those who fill those departments always to have an eye to the importance of
giving a character to those departments-of preserving that respectability without
which they would cease to answer the ends proposed in their institution. 
10 1
The traditional view is that Johnson stood alone in the face of a
Marshall juggernaut. A.J. Levin, for example, concluded the second of
eight articles devoted to Johnson with the observation that he "was
not only the first dissenter on the American constitutional scene, he
was the first creative, the first scientific dissenter."102 Oliver
Schroeder spoke approvingly of "Johnson's independence of thinking
and freedom from Chief Justice Marshall's restraining influence.1 03
And biographer Donald Morgan, noting Johnson's death on August 4,
1834, following surgery on his jaw, declared that "[h]e died as he
lived-resolute, courageous, alone."10 4 The most extravagant claim
was made in a Note by Meredith Kolsky, who argued that "[h]ad
Johnson not initiated the practice of writing separately, the Court
could have gone without a meaningful dissent during its first thirty-
five years. ' 10
5
Johnson did doggedly pursue what he believed to be his
obligation and right to speak separately in a series of concurring and
dissenting opinions that are notable both for their sheer numbers and
the high proportion of his overall contributions they represent. But the
"opinion of the Court" practice he contested did not originate with
Marshall. And, after the years when Marshall arguably had only
Washington to assist him and the comfort of a comparatively small
docket, Marshall no longer labored alone. I doubt that Johnson caused
the shift in any meaningful sense, as it had begun before he arrived
and would have been completed without him. More tellingly, if we look
carefully at the Court's work during this period, the truly striking
thing about Johnson's output lies not in what he wrote when he
concurred and dissented, but in his telling silence on numerous other
occasions.
101. Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, supra note 47, at 369.
102. Levin, supra note 53, at 548.
103. Oliver Schroeder, Jr., The Life and Judicial Work of Justice William Johnson, Jr. Part
II, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 385-86 (1947).
104. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 280.
105. Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court




Johnson was a persistently independent voice on the Court, but
his legacy is not simply that of someone who said "no." For example,
Johnson's first major opinion for the Court, United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin,10 6 became a landmark. The question was whether federal
courts could exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Johnson parsed the text of Article III, stressing that only the Supreme
Court[] "possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the
constitution."10 7 All other federal courts "possess no jurisdiction but
what is given them by" Congress, "the power that creates them."'08
That had not been done. Johnson conceded that all federal courts
must, of necessity, possess certain implied powers, 109 but he
maintained that "jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among
those powers." 110 That, Johnson declared, was the holding of "the
majority of this Court,""' a qualification that excluded Story, who did
not file a dissent but refused to accept the ruling.
1 2
His disagreements with Marshall were occasionally prophetic.
In Fletcher v. Peck,13 for example, Johnson did "not hesitate to
declare," in line with Marshall's opinion for the Court, "that a state
does not possess the power of revoking its own grants."" 4 But he made
it clear that his "opinion on this point [was] not founded on the
provision in the constitution of the United States, relative to laws
impairing the obligation of contracts."115 Rather, he appealed to
natural law, "a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a
principle which will impose laws even on the deity."116 He also refused
to accept the notion that these limits on state authority were absolute,
rejecting the idea that a state could never impair a contract." 7 He
returned to that theme in Ogden v. Saunders, arguing that "to assign
to contracts, universally, a literal purport, and to exact for them a
106. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
107. Id. at 33.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 34.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 32.
112. Story's reservations about Hudson and subsequent attempts to distinguish or evade it
are detailed in R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC 100-06 (1985).
113. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
114. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 144.
116. Id. at 143.
117. Id. at 145.
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rigid literal fulfillment, could not have been the intent of the
constitution." 118 That position subsequently became a core element in
Chief Justice Hughes's opinion for the Court in Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell,119 a decision that vindicated Johnson,
while at the same time almost certainly misreading the Contracts
Clause's original purpose.
120
These and other examples of Johnson's contributions are
interesting and would be worth examining in greater detail had I "but
world enough and time."121 The important point for current purposes
is that Johnson did not wield the bully pulpit of separate opinions to
distance himself from the Marshall Court holdings that lay at the
heart of the criticisms mounted by Jefferson and his allies. Indeed, in
one of his letters to Jefferson, Johnson stated directly and
unequivocally both that the Court had been largely correct in its
decisions and that the people realized this:
I cannot I acknowledge but flatter myself that in the main the Country is satisfied with
our Decisions .... I acknowledge that some things have fallen from particular Judges
which are exceptionable, and I exceedingly regret their Publication. But when the
Decisions are examined upon their own Merits independently of the bad or defective
Reasons of the Judge who delivers them, I do flatter myself that all in which I ever
concurred will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
1 2 2
Most scholars recognize that Johnson was not a doctrinaire
Republican and certainly not a clone of Jefferson. 123 Many attribute
this to Marshall's influence.1 24 But the reality is much more
complicated, especially if we look carefully at one of the most
important bones of contention in the struggle between the Marshall
Court and the Jeffersonian Republicans: the "heresy of implied
powers. '"125 Johnson's so-called silence in these matters was both
principled and entirely in character. It was also quite significant given
118. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827) (opinion of Johnson, J.). The four Justices in the
majority (Washington, Johnson, Thompson, and Trimble) delivered their opinions seriatim.
Marshall, in his only dissent in a major constitutional case, wrote for himself, Duvall, and Story.
119. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
120. See generally id. at 453-64 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (exploring the original intent at
length).
121. I have waited far too long to borrow a line from one of my favorite poems and cite one of
my all time favorite books. The line is from Andrew Marvell's poem To His Coy Mistress, which
may be found in FRANCIS CONNOLLY, MAN AND HIS MEASURE 535-36 (1964).
122. Johnson, Apr. 11 Letter, supra note 95, at 210.
123. See, e.g., WHITE, MARSHALL COURT, supra note 55, at 342 ("On issues of federalism...
the two men diverged.").
124. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 1, at 289 ("Johnson came to share much of Marshall's
nationalism.").
125. See id. at 110-25 (containing chapter entitled, "The Heresy of Implied Powers").
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Johnson's personality, the contexts within which the cases were
decided, and the opportunities they presented.
One of the major themes in the small body of scholarship
focusing on Johnson is the "lost years," the period when this
heretofore courageous, independent voice was muted, even as
Marshall fashioned many of the most important artifacts in his
nationalist vision. In particular, Johnson is described as having gone
absent without leave in the struggle to maintain state sovereignty in
the fk -e of an increasingly powerful federal presence. Morgan states,
for example, that "Johnson's campaign for free expression had brought
results. Yet beginning in 1819 he virtually relinquished the right he
had earlier secured. At four terms he merged his voice with the others
and nodded his approval of Marshall's nationalizing opinions."12 6
Morgan argues that Johnson "silent[ly] acquiesce[d] in 1819"
and that he "recovered his balance . . . [d]uring the winter of 1822-
1823 [when] he took a fresh look at the judicial function." 127 But if we
examine carefully the period in question, a different picture emerges.
The numbers, for example, show that Johnson's pen was not still.
Morgan's own tally has Johnson writing six opinions for the Court in
1819; five majority opinions, one concurrence, and one dissent in 1820;
seven majority opinions and one dissent in 1821; and two majority
opinions in 1822. The dam supposedly broke in 1823, when Johnson
wrote five majority opinions, two concurrences, and two dissents. 128
This is not the record of a judicial hermit who had temporarily
taken a vow of silence. Moreover, Johnson was hardly a shrinking
violet when he did express himself. Indeed, the circumstances leading
up to one of his dissents, filed in The Amiable Isabella,129 are worth
recounting in some detail, as they show that Johnson's independent
spirit was certainly alive-albeit hardly well-during the period in
question.
The Amiable Isabella was initially argued in March 1820.
When Marshall announced that it would be "continued to the next
Term for advisement,"1 30 Johnson publicly expressed his rage. As
recounted by Henry Wheaton, then reporter for the Court:
Mr. Justice J. announced, with great emotion, his determination to fire off-stating that
his mind was unalterably made up, and as the last argument, so far from shaking, had
confirmed his first impression, he thought the party entitled to the benefit of his vote,
126. Morgan, Origin, supra note 47, at 367-68.
127. Id.
128. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 307.
129. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
130. Memoranda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) vii (1820).
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which might be lost in case death, or any other cause, should prevent him being present
next Term. 
13 1
Johnson was not content, however, to simply "read the same
opinion which he first drew up. ' 132 Rather, he also lashed out at
William Pinkney for his argument on behalf of the respondents,
"treating it with the utmost contempt as a flimsy declamation of a
venal advocate for privateerism, masked under the appearance of the
sanction of the Government."133 Wheaton concludes his account with a
description of the response to Johnson's outburst:
Pinkney was so outraged that it was with difficulty that Wirt and myself could keep him
from getting up and discharging his resentment in open Court. Every person present
was equally struck with the extraordinary want of dignity, or rather of decency, in the
learned judge's conduct; and nothing is talked of but his tirade. The judges lament this
extravagant sally, which was the more unfortunate as great numbers of persons were
assembled for the purpose of hearing the decision of the Court. Judge Washington
assures me that everything was done that could be done to prevent it, but in vain.
1 3 4
Johnson was clearly not someone who had receded into the
background, silent and cowed. He was, rather, "restless, turbulent,
hot-headed," and "flaringly independent," as John Quincy Adams
described him in his account of the episode. 13 5 The William Johnson of
1819 through 1822 did not lose his voice. Instead, he selected, more or
less carefully, those occasions when he would use it.136
This brings me to my main point: Johnson supported implied
federal powers and, by necessary extension, joined decisions placing
limits on state sovereignty. The primary exhibit in most discussions of
these issues is Marshall's opinion for the Court in M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 37 which Johnson joined. Morgan initially argues that this
"silent acquiescence" was at best grudging, citing Johnson's December
131. Letter from Henry Wheaton to Joseph Story (Mar. 17, 1820), quoted in WHITE,
MARSHALL COURT, supra note 55, at 334 [hereinafter Wheaton Letter]. Wheaton was also an
occasional advocate before the Court and was counsel for respondents in this case.
132. Id. This presumably occurred on March 4, 1820. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 1, 15 (1821).
133. Wheaton Letter, supra note 131, at 334.
134. Id.; see also Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Mar. 27, 1820), in 5 ADAMS, MEMOIRS,
supra note 33, at 39, 43 (noting Johnson's "very extraordinary sally" and "great passion"). Adams
noted that Johnson "threatened to publish his speech, but afterwards thought better of it." Id.
135. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Mar. 27, 1820), in 5 ADAMS, MEMOIRS, supra note
33, at 39, 43.
136. The Court eventually ruled for Pinkney's clients in an opinion by Story, with Johnson
dissenting. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. at 25 (opinion of Story, J.); id. at 81 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting, preceded by notation "three Judges dissent"). Regarding the context for all of this, see
WHITE, MARSHALL COURT, supra note 55, at 334 ("Behind Johnson's outburst... was a
controversy between him and Story over the latter's efforts for expand the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts, a tendency Johnson firmly opposed.").
137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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1822 letter to Jefferson in which he characterized implied powers as
"that Bane of our civil Tranquility."138 Morgan subsequently seems to
change that assessment, however, implying that Johnson influenced
the manner in which Marshall wrote the opinion.
139
The suggestion that Johnson helped shape what Marshall
wrote in M'Cuiloch is plausible. Marshall's opinion argued for
considerable deference toward Congress, one of Johnson's favorite
themes. But the record also shows that, if anything, Johnson's
embrace of implied powers was even more pronounced than
Marshall's.
To his credit, Morgan acknowledges that Johnson's support for
these "Hamiltonian views," which stood in stark contrast to
Jefferson's, was nothing new. 140 In 1801, while still on the state bench,
Johnson declared in State v. Pitman that "[t]he national government
may pass such laws as may be proper and necessary to avoid the
mischiefs arising from the counterfeiting, and passing, as true, the
forged bills of credit of the bank of the nation."141 Johnson also
recognized that this necessarily limited the authority of the states,
observing that "[s]tate governments may not also pass such laws, as
they shall deem necessary, to the welfare of their internal concerns, in
relation to the same subject."
142
Jefferson may well have had second thoughts about appointing
Johnson had he known about Pitman when Gallatin recommended
Johnson in 1804.143 But the vetting process at the time was much
more informal than it is now. Gallatin and Jefferson relied on general
assurances that Johnson had appropriate "Republican connections."
' 144
That characterization proved wrong as Johnson time and again cast
his lot with Marshall during the protracted process that led to
M'Culloch. That was significant; Johnson could have made life quite
138. Johnson, Dec. 10 Letter, supra note 47, at 340.
139. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 250 ("The Charlestonian had endorsed the McCulloch opinion,
and in return had very probably brought pressure on Marshall to qualify its scope.").
140. See id. at 112 (stating that Johnson had "started down the path" of supporting these
views "[1l]ong before" M'Culloch).
141. State v. Pitman, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 32, 32 (1801).
142. Id.
143. Then again, perhaps not, as President Jefferson seemed much more enthused about
implied powers than he would be in his later years. See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the
Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification, Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT.
REV. 81, 127-31 (contrasting Jefferson's views with his actual conduct) [hereinafter Killenbeck,
Pursuing]. It is at least plausible that Johnson was the first "stealth nominee," an issue I will
explore in another article, but note now to claim pride of authorship for the phrase and concept.




difficult for Marshall and the Court at any number of points during
this sequence.
One criticism of M'Culloch is that it is "overrated" because,
"with regard to the concrete issue involved in McCulloch-the
constitutionality of the national bank-the decision was completely
unexceptionable."' 145 That is certainly true as a technical matter; the
implied powers doctrine had been recognized long before the bank
question came to the Court. Indeed, it was initially outlined by
Marshall during Johnson's first Term on the Court in United States v.
Fisher, a case in which Marshall rejected the argument that "no
[federal] law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to
give effect to a specified power." 146 Rather, he emphasized:
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said with respect
to each, that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained by other means.
Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means
which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.
1 4 7
Johnson joined Marshall's opinion and apparently did so
without reservation. That is not, of course, because he felt compelled
to toe the line, for it is quite clear that dissonant voices were tolerated
dt the time. Fisher was, after all, the case in which Justice
Washington, while stating, "I take no part in the decision of this
cause,"1 48 explained at length why his construction of the applicable
statutes was correct. Washington did not address or dispute
Marshall's discussion of the constitutional question. The fact of his
statement is nevertheless significant, for it certainly presented an
opportunity for the newest member of the Court to join forces with a
respected elder, assuming that he felt inclined to disagree with what
Marshall had to say.
Johnson himself subsequently recognized the existence of
implied powers in his opinion for the Court in Hudson & Goodwin.
149
He then concurred in the next important statement of that principle,
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.150 Story wrote for the Court, Marshall
145. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1128-29 (2001). As I have argued at length, these sorts of criticisms lose much of
their force when M'Culloch is assessed in the light of the political, economic, and social contexts
within which the case was decided. See generally MARK R. KILLENBECK, M'CULLOCH V.
MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION 113-14 (2006) [hereinafter KILLENBECK, MCULLOCH]; Mark R.
Killenbeck, Context and Content: The Enduring Importance of M'Culloch v. Maryland, 8
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING 31 (2007).
146. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 397 (statement of Washington, J.).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
150. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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having at least in theory, but perhaps not in fact, recused himself
because of his and his family's interests in the land at issue.151 Story
observed in language that anticipated one of the most noted passages
in M'Culloch that "[t]he constitution unavoidably deals in general
language." 152 This meant that "its powers are expressed in general
terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own
means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the
exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests,
should require."
153
Johnson filed a concurring opinion, stating, "I acquiesce in
their opinion, but not altogether in the reasoning, or opinion, of my
brother who delivered it."154 His disagreement, in effect, was one of
form rather than function. He agreed that "the general government"
must have "the power of protecting itself in the exercise of its
constitutional powers." 155 The Virginia court's refusal to recognize and
give effect to the Supreme Court's judgments was "truly alarming."156
He did not, however, see fit to join in what "amounts to an assertion of
the inferiority or dependence of the state tribunals."1 57 The
"constitution and laws," he declared, "place us . . supreme over
persons and cases as far as our judicial powers extend, but not
asserting any compulsory control over the state tribunals." 158 This
sensitivity to the prerogatives and status of the states and state courts
tracked in important respects Republican orthodoxy at the time.
Johnson did not, however, use this occasion to distance himself from
the doctrine of implied powers.
The foundations for M'Culloch had been laid carefully, with the
willing support of William Johnson, long before the case was decided.
The bank decision itself was, of course, wildly unpopular in certain
quarters, particularly Virginia. One of the most important set of
responses was initiated by Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond
Enquirer, who decried the "alarming errors" committed by the Court
151. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Reassessing John Marshall, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 673, 679-84
(2001) (discussing Marshall's involvement). Chuck Hobson disagrees, characterizing White's take
on Marshall's actions as an "elaborate tale." Charles F. Hobson, Letter to the Editor, 59 WM. &
MARY Q. 331, 331 (2002).
152. Martin, 14 U.S. at 326; cf. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (noting
that the Constitution does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code" but rather "requires ...
only [that] its great outlines should be marked").
153. Id. at 326-27.
154. Id. at 362 (Johnson, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 363.
156. Id. at 364.
157. Id. at 379.
158. Id. at 362
432 [Vol. 62:2:407
WILLIAM JOHNSON
and declared that "[w]henever state rights are threatened or invaded,
Virginia will not be the last to sound the tocsin."159 He then "earnestly
recommended" the first of William Brockenbrough's two Amphictyon
essays to the paper's readers. These precipitated two of the most
extraordinary exchanges in American legal history, as John Marshall
responded anonymously first to Brockenbrough in his "A Friend to the
Union" pieces and then to Spencer Roane's Hampden articles as "A
Friend to the Constitution," in the pages of the Alexandria Gazette. 1
60
Marshall's willingness to step beyond the strict bounds of
judicial propriety was remarkable, but in character. He believed that
"as those who favor [the decision] never write for the publick it will
remain undefended & of course be considered as damnably
heretical."'61 He therefore thought it imperative to fill the gap and
defend both the institution to which he had dedicated his life and its
decision.
It was, interestingly, an example Johnson followed some years
later when one of his opinions on circuit, Elkison v. Deliesseline,162 was
denounced. South Carolina passed the Negro Seamen Act in 1822,
authorizing the seizure of "free Negroes or persons of color" who came
into the state on ships docking in its harbors. 63 Henry Elkison, a
British subject, was seized pursuant to the law and filed a petition for
relief with Johnson, who was sitting in his capacity as Circuit Justice.
Johnson held the operative section of the statute unconstitutional.1
64
Anticipating the views he expressed the following year in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 65 he ruled that the act was inconsistent with the federal
commerce power, which he characterized as "a paramount and
exclusive right."' 66 The opinion was denounced bitterly and at length
by state-rights activists, who characterized it as "utterly at variance
with the fundamental principles of our government."'167 Johnson, like
159. On the Opinion of the Supreme Court, RICHMOND ENQUIRER (Va.), Mar. 30, 1819, at 3.
160. The best single source for the texts of these essays is GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (1969). The letters in which Marshall
describes and justifies his actions may be found in 8 MARSHALL, PAPERS, supra note 48, at 282-
363. For a discussion of the exchange, see KILLENBECK, M'CULLOCH, supra note 145, at 123-40.
161. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Mar. 24, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 280, 280.
162. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
163. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 192.
164. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 496.
165. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
166. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 495.
167. Zeno, Municipal Laws-No. I, CHARLESTON COURIER (S.C.), Sept. 9, 1823, at 2. See
generally Donald G. Morgan, Justice William Johnson on the Treaty-Making Power, 22 GEO.
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Marshall before him, responded, defending the holding both in signed
letters and under the pseudonym Philonimus, and warning that "if
public opinion does not rally to put down such gross attacks, public
decency is at an end, and bullies and duellists alone must 'judge the
land.' "168
The controversy generated by M'Culloch was protracted and
intense. Jefferson joined the fray in September 1819 in a letter to
Spencer Roane within which he commended him for expressing "the
true principles of the revolution of 1800" and complained that
Marshall and his colleagues had made the "constitution... a mere
thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist, and
shape in any form they please."169 In a similar vein, one of Jefferson's
staunchest allies, John Taylor, wrote a book-length attack that linked
the decision to one of the festering issues of the day, slavery,
predicting that the implied powers doctrine "will beget new
usurpations of internal powers over persons and property, and these
will beget a dissolution of the union."170
Johnson was certainly aware of all of these criticisms. But they
clearly did not faze him. In 1821, he offered an even more sweeping
statement of the implied powers principle in the first post-M'Culloch
affirmation of it, Anderson v. Dunn.1 71 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Johnson held that the House of Representatives had the power to
"punish for contempts" even though "there is no power given by the
constitution" to do so.1 72 He conceded the theoretical point that "the
genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of
implied powers." 173 He then asked: "But what is the fact? There is not
in the whole of that admirable instrument[] a grant of powers which
does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise,
not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and
subordinate."174
WASH. L. REV. 187, 193 (1953) ("Seldom if ever has an American judge suffered from his
townsmen so sustained and acrid a volley of criticism and abuse.").
168. Philonimus, Review of the Numbers of Caroliniensi-No. 4, CHARLESTON MERCURY (S.C.),
Sept. 5, 1823, at 2.
169. Letter from Spencer Roane to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1819), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 135, 135-37.
170. JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 298 (photo.
reprint 1970) (1820).
171. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
172. Id. at 225.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 225-26.
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The day after the Anderson decision, Marshall delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court in Cohens v. Virginia,175 a case that, if
anything, provoked an even more hostile reaction than M'Culloch.
Two brothers had been convicted for selling District of Columbia
lottery tickets in Virginia. They claimed that the lottery had been
authorized by Congress and that the Virginia prohibition was invalid.
The Court rejected that defense, holding that the lottery statute
applied only in the District. It did not, however, accept Virginia's
argument that the Court did not have jurisdiction, either as a general
matter given that state's longstanding objections to federal judicial
review of its courts' decisions, or as a consequence of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Cohens generated significant controversy and commentary both
before and after the Court's decision. Virginians believed that the case
posed a conflict that ran to "the very teeth of the constitution."' 176 A
holding that jurisdiction existed posed the specter-or at least so they
believed and argued-that "every case whatsoever may be brought
before the [federal courts], and the extent of their jurisdiction depends
on their own will."'
77
Marshall acknowledged what was at stake: "To interfere with
the penal laws of a State, where they are not levelled against the
legitimate powers of the Union, but have as their sole object the
internal government of the country, is a serious measure, which
Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly, or inconsiderately."'
' 7 8
Nevertheless, "the judicial department.., is authorized to decide all
cases of every description, arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States."'179 This was one such case, and the fact that the state
was a party did not eliminate jurisdiction. Marshall rejected Virginia's
argument that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to protect "a
State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory
appearance before the tribunal of the nation."'80 In his mind, a careful
examination of the facts that gave rise to that amendment revealed
that it "extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals, but
not to those brought by States."18'
175. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
176. National Lottery-Again, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Oct. 27, 1820, at 3.
177. State Rights, The Lottery Case, No. 6, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Jan. 2, 1821, at 2.
178. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 443.
179. Id. at 382.
180. Id. at 406.
181. Id. at 407. Marshall's views on the Eleventh Amendment are worth exploring, albeit at
another time and in another place. For some perspectives, see WHITE, MARSHALL COURT, supra
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The outcry after Cohens was so intense that Marshall declared
that the Court's opinion was being "attacked with a degree of
virulence superior even to that which was employed in the Bank
question." 18 2 He suspected that Jefferson was behind this, musing that
"there is some reason to believe that the essays written ... were, in a
degree at least, stimulated by this gentleman; and that, although the
coarseness of language belongs exclusively to the Author, its acerbity
has been increased by his communications with the great Lama of the
mountains."18
3
Jefferson had indeed been actively complaining. Nine days
after Cohens was decided, he informed Roane, who would write some
of the most virulent attacks on the decision, that "[t]he great object of
my fear is the federal judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever acting,
with noiseless foot, and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by
step, and holding what it gains, is ingulphing insidiously the special
governments into the jaws which feeds them."18 4 That December, he
maintained that "[i]t is a misnomer to call a government republican,
in which a branch of the supreme power is independent of the
nation."18 5 Various possible reforms, including "the erection of the
Senate into an appellate court in Constitutional questions," 18 6 seemed
impractical. "Impeachment," in turn, "is a bugbear which [the
Justices] fear not at all,"187 as the practice of delivering a single
opinion for the Court had the effect of "smothering the evidence."'
88
One appropriate solution was, at least for Jefferson, glaringly
obvious: seriatim opinions, which would force the Justices "to justify
themselves to the world by explaining the reasons which led to their
opinion."'1 9 Who better to enlist in the battle to force the Court to
return to a practice Marshall had supposedly destroyed than
Jefferson's first nominee to the Court? And so Jefferson pressed his
case in his exchange of letters with Johnson.
note 55, at 516-17; Mark R. Killenbeck, In(re)Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective, 57
ARK. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2004).
182. Letter from John Marshall to Henry Wheaton (June 2, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 150, 150.
183. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 183, 183.
184. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Mar. 9, 1821), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 201, 201-02.
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (Dec. 26, 1821), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 213, 215.
186. Id. at 214.
187. Id. at 215.




Partial vindication came in Johnson's concurring opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden.190 Johnson declared that "[t]he judgment entered by
the Court in this cause, has my entire approbation." 191 He wrote
separately, however, for two reasons. One tracked his longstanding
belief that he should speak out when he had "views of the subject
materially different from those of my brethren."192 But he had "also,
another inducement," one that fulfilled his pledge to Jefferson, for "in
questions of great importance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to the
public best discharged, by an effort to maintain my opinions in my
own way." 1
93
This would not, of course, involve seriatim opinions by the
Justices, which is what Jefferson wanted. Moreover, Johnson's views
offered scant comfort to his patron. Marshall's opinion for the Court in
Gibbons was noteworthy for its sweeping definition of commerce and
its recognition that "[t]he completely internal commerce of a State...
may be considered as reserved for the State itself."194 That observation
seemed to leave open a critical question: Was the federal power to
regulate commerce exclusive? Marshall's opinion arguably suggested
that the answer was yes. But its reliance on the preemptive effect of
the Federal Coasting Licensing Act left room for argument.
Johnson went further. Picking up where he left off the previous
year in Elkison and anticipating aspects of his position in Osborn v.
President, Directors & Co. of the Bank of the United States,195 Johnson
argued for a more expansive view of the federal commerce power than
Marshall's and grounded the need for that approach in the sins of the
states. The states had been "selfish," and their insistence on passing
"iniquitous laws and impolitic measures ... was the immediate cause,
that led to the forming of a convention." 196 The document that
emerged in turn gave Congress "exclusive grants ... of power over
commerce." 19
7
The Court eventually rejected the exclusivity theory in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia.198 Johnson's opinion
in Gibbons is nevertheless noteworthy because it came at precisely the
moment when he was under assault by Jefferson, who was trying
190. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
191. Id. at 222 (Johnson, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 222-23.
193. Id. at 223.
194. Id. at 195.
195. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
196. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 224 (Johnson, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 236.
198. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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mightily to persuade Johnson that "the Supreme Court has advanced
beyond its constitutional limits, and trespassed on those of the State
authorities "199
The full extent of Johnson's judicial apostasy became clear
seventeen days later in Osborn. The case arose when the Ohio state
auditor was ordered to collect a tax on the Second Bank that had been
authorized by the Ohio legislature in February 1819, just before
M'Culloch was argued. State agents entered the bank's branch in
Chillicothe and confiscated over one hundred thousand dollars in cash
and bank notes, which eventually were deposited in the state treasury
in Columbus. The bank sought an injunction against collection, and
the case eventually made its way to the Court.
Osborn is read and taught today, if at all, for the proposition
that because Congress chartered the Second Bank, any case in which
it was involved as a litigant was one that "[arose] under a law of the
United States."200 Although that was an important element of the
case, it by no means does the case full justice. As Marshall noted, "[a]
revision of [M'Culloch] has been requested; and many considerations
combine to induce a review of it."201 But the Court refused to retreat,
reaffirming that the bank was both an appropriate instrument of
federal policy and protected from the interference of the states:
Considering the capacity of carrying on the trade of banking, as an important feature in
the character of this corporation, which was necessary, to make it a fit instrument for
the objects for which it was created, the Court adheres to its decision in the case of
M'Culloch against The State of Maryland, and is of opinion, that the act of the State of
Ohio, which is certainly much more objectionable than that of the State of Maryland, is
repugnant to a law of the United States, made in pursuance of the constitution, and,
therefore, void.
2 0 2
Johnson filed a lengthy and vigorous dissent. He refused to
believe "that the constitution sanctions the vesting of the right of
action in this Bank... merely on the ground that a question might
possibly be raised in it, involving the constitution, or constitutionality
of a law, of the United States. '20 3 Repeating a theme voiced on
numerous other occasions, he posed the specter of a jurisdictional
slippery slope, under which "[t]he whole jurisdiction over contracts,
might thus have been taken from the State Courts, and conferred
199. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 12 JEFFERSON,
WORKS, supra note 84, at 252 n.1, 254-55.
200. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 826.
201. Id. at 859.
202. Id. at 867-68.
203. Id. at 874 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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upon those of the United States. ' 20 4 This was vintage Johnson-a
detailed argument against judicial expansion of federal court
jurisdiction, especially where he suspected that the case was either
not ripe or feigned. 205 Johnson did not, however, distance himself from
the bank and, by necessary implication, the core of the implied powers
doctrine. Moreover, the manner in which he indicated that he agreed
that the bank was constitutional was a direct affront to Jefferson and
his allies.
Johnson began by declaring that he had "little doubt that the
public mind will be easily reconciled to the decision of the Court" in
one important respect: the extent to which it embraced the "obvious
policy" that "the Bank is to be sustained."206 The bank, he stressed, "is
now identified with the administration of the national government."20 7
"It is an immense machine, economically and beneficially applied to
the fiscal transactions of the nation. Attempts have been made to
dispense with it, and they have failed; serious and very weighty
doubts have been entertained of its constitutionality, but they have
been abandoned."
208
More telling, given Jefferson's state-rights orientation, the
bank was needed to counter problems posed by the states, which had
succumbed to a "rage for multiplying Banks" that had "inundated the
country with ... bills of credit, against which it was obvious that the
provisions of the constitution opposed no adequate inhibition."20 9 The
appropriate national response was then a
specie-paying Bank [of the United States], with an overwhelming capital, and the whole
aid of the government deposits [which] presented the only resource to which the
204. Id.
205. It is also an area where Johnson's views have been embraced by the Court. Compare
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 886 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("The judicial power extends only to 'cases
arising,' that is, actual, not potential cases."), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147
(1810) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("It appears to me to bear strong evidence, upon the face of it, of
being a mere feigned case. It is our duty to decide on the rights, but not on the speculations of
parties."), with United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1946) ("The power of
courts, and ultimately of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises
only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough."), and Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding.").
206. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 872. This tracked one portion of the Marshall opinion, where, in response to one
argument raised, he stated that "[tihe Bank is not considered as a private corporation, whose
principal object is individual trade and individual profit; but as a public corporation, created for
public and national purposes." Id. at 860.
208. Id. at 872 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 873.
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government could resort, to restore that power over the currency of the country, which
the framers of the constitution evidently intended to give to Congress alone.
2 10
Johnson's embrace of the bank was complete. More
importantly, the manner in which he framed his opinion mounted a
telling indictment of many of the core precepts championed by
Jefferson and his allies, particularly Johnson's pointed observations of
the dangers posed by the "individual cupidity, and the exercise of
State power. '
211
One final perspective on Johnson's views is found in the other
major implied powers debate during this period: the question of the
federal government's power to itself undertake internal improvement
projects. 212 The issue provoked both protracted discussion and
inconsistent conduct. Jefferson, for example, recognized the value of
internal improvement.213 But he maintained, at least in his public
pronouncements, that such measures required a constitutional
amendment.21 4 This did not prevent him, however, from signing the
measures authorizing the construction of the Cumberland Road. 21 5
Some of the constitutional concerns were arguably resolved in
M'Culloch. Yet many individuals continued to believe that internal
improvement was different and that a constitutional amendment was
required. One of these individuals was President James Monroe, who
announced in his first annual message his "settled conviction" that
this power was "not contained in any of the specified powers granted
to Congress, nor can I consider it incidental to or a necessary means,
viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the
powers which are specifically granted. '216 Monroe felt obliged "to
suggest to Congress the propriety of recommending to the States the
adoption of an amendment . . . which shall give to Congress the right
in question. '217 He also believed that this "compelled" him to veto the
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Killenbeck, Pursuing, supra note 143, at
127-37. For a general discussion, see JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT:
NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED
STATES (2001).
213. Thomas Jefferson, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1806), in 1 RICHARDSON, supra note
18, at 393, 397 (discussing the "great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and
such other objects of public improvement").
214. Id. (believing such projects should be undertaken only if "it may be thought proper to
add to the constitutional enumeration of Federal powers").
215. See An Act to Regulate the Laying Out and Making a Road from Cumberland, in the
State of Maryland, to the State of Ohio, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357 (1806).
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1822 act authorizing preservation and repair of the Cumberland
road.218 He did not, however, simply issue a veto message. Rather, he
also wrote a forty-page explanation of his constitutional reservations,
setting the stage for what followed.
219
Monroe's mini-treatise was printed and widely circulated, with
the Justices of the Court among its recipients. This led to a truly
remarkable extrajudicial exercise when Johnson sent Monroe the
following letter, which merits quoting in its entirety:
Judge Johnson has had the honor to submit the President's argument on the subject of
internal improvements to his brother-judges and is instructed to make the following
report.
The judges are deeply sensible of the mark of confidence bestowed on them in this
instance and should be unworthy of that confidence did they attempt to conceal their
real opinion. Indeed, to conceal or disavow it would be now impossible as they are all of
the opinion that the decision on the bank question completely commits them on the
subject of internal improvements as to post-roads and military roads. On the other
points it is impossible to resist the lucid and conclusive reasoning in the argument.
The principle assumed in the case of the Bank is that the grant of the principal power
carries with it the grant of all adequate and appropriate means of executing it. That the
selection of those means must rest with the general government and as to that power
and those means the Constitution makes the government of the U.S. supreme.
J. J. would take the liberty of suggesting to the President that it would not be
unproductive of good, if the Sec'y of State were to have the opinion of this Court on the
bank question printed and dispersed throughout the Union.
J. J. is strongly impressed with the President's views of the difficulty and delicacy
attendant on any effort that might be made by the U.S. to carry into effect any scheme
of internal improvement through the states, and as a question of policy or expediency
sees plainly how prudent it would be to prepare them for it by the most conciliatory
means.
2 20
Johnson's assertion that he had been "instructed" to act and
that his letter represented the views of the full Court is doubtful for a
number of reasons. The Court, in response to a request made on behalf
of President Washington, had made it quite clear that it would not
issue advisory opinions. 221 Johnson's letter may have been informal in
the sense that it was a letter from a single Justice, but it clearly
purported to be advisory and as such was contrary to Court policy.
218. James Monroe, Veto Message (May 4, 1822), in 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 711,
711.
219. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal
Improvements (May 4, 1822), in 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 713, 713-52.
220. Letter from William Johnson to James Monroe (undated), in MORGAN, supra note 1, at
123, 123-24 [hereinafter Johnson, Letter to Monroe].
221. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in
6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 755, 755.
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It is also clear that Johnson did not speak for the Court. The
boardinghouse tradition remained in full force at the time and the
brethren would certainly have discussed Monroe's pamphlet. Marshall
wrote Monroe, indicating that he had read the document "with great
attention and interest. ' 222 He then appeared to support some of
Monroe's arguments:
This is a question which very much divides the opinions of intelligent men; and it is not
to be expected that there will be an entire concurrence in that you have expressed. All
however will I think admit that your views are profound, and that you have thought
deeply on the subject. To me they appear to be most generally just.
A general power over internal improvement, if to be exercised by the Union, would
almost certainly be cumbersome to the government, & of no utility to the people. But, to
the extent you recommend, it would be productive of no mischief, and of great good. I
despair however of the adoption of such a measure.223
Story, in turn, refused to commit himself in any way, observing that
"[u]pon the constitutional question, I do not feel at liberty to express
any opinion as it may hereafter perhaps come for discussion before the
Supreme Court. '
224
Johnson's reading of M'Culloch was arguably narrow, confining
its endorsement of federal internal improvement projects to "post-
roads and military roadS. ' 225 His articulation of the general principle
was, nevertheless, sweeping. And his emphasis on the latitude
Congress presumably enjoyed in making judgments about what might
be "necessary and proper" was both consistent with his views on the
scope of congressional power and pointed in the light of the fears
expressed by those who viewed the Marshall Court decisions with
alarm.
V.
What, then, are we to make of William Johnson? Most of the
literature divides roughly into two camps. The first group, which
includes individuals such as Levin, Schroeder, and Morgan,
emphasizes Johnson the dissenter, the lonely and courageous
individual who took on John Marshall and persuaded him to abandon
his avowed intent to have the Court speak always with a single voice.
These same individuals also praise certain of Johnson's opinions,
222. Letter from John Marshall to James Monroe (June 13, 1822), in 9 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 236, 236.
223. Id.
224. Letter from Joseph Story to James Monroe (June 24, 1822), quoted in 2 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 56 (1923).
225. Johnson, Letter to Monroe, supra note 220, at 123.
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finding in them an "incisive critique" of the Marshall majority and "a
unified and consistent philosophy of the Constitution."
226
The alternate view is that Johnson was a decidedly
independent voice on the Court whose legacy is, at best, mixed. Ted
White describes him as "independent, impetuous, and tactless" and
concludes that "he was a maverick rather than a figure of genuine
influence on the Marshall Court."227 Herb Johnson notes that "William
Johnson's appointment to the Court introduced a forceful personality
into the hitherto restrained atmosphere that welcomed Marshall's
leadership." 228 But he also observes that William Johnson "has
enjoyed the fate of most dissenters-he is forgotten in constitutional
history."229 Even Morgan, who believed with some justification that
"[i]n learning, wisdom, and firmness of character, Johnson had few
peers on the early Court," ultimately concedes that Johnson was
simply unable to fulfill Jefferson's expectations and assume a
leadership role because he "lacked precisely those qualities of
personality and temperament that so well equipped Marshall for his
task."
230
I readily confess that I have just begun to develop an
understanding of Johnson's extensive and complex record. Much
remains to be done. For the time being, I believe that the most
important consideration in assessing William Johnson is what he
might have done but did not. It is in this respect that he was the
judicial dog that did indeed bark, but not when he might have been
expected to.
The Court on which Johnson sat was in the first stages of
judicial maturity, having emerged from the obscurity under which it
labored in the early years of the new nation. Its major decisions from
1816 through 1824 had "brought into operation the whole antifederal
spirit of Virginia."231 A unified front whenever possible was essential:
the Court had "external & political enemies enough."
232
226. Donald G. Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution, 57 HARv. L. REV.
328, 335 (1944).
227. WHITE, MARSHALL COURT, supra note 55, at 343.
228. JOHNSON, MARSHALL, supra note 6, at 33.
229. Johnson, Constitutional Thought, supra note 1, at 132.
230. Donald G. Morgan, Marshall, the Marshall Court, and the Constitution, in CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL 168, 184 (W. Melville Jones ed., 1956).
231. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Apr. 28, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 309, 309.
232. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 13, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL, PAPERS,
supra note 48, at 178, 179.
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M'Culloch and Cohens were unanimous opinions. Johnson, it
seemed, had joined the enemy. His acceptance of implied powers had,
of course, been longstanding, and his opinion in Anderson was more
sweeping than any Marshall had written. But Johnson had repeatedly
expressed reservations about both feigned cases and judicial
expansion of federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states. Certain
aspects of his silence are therefore puzzling. It was, for example, fairly
widely known that M'Culloch was an "arranged" case. In December
1818, Governor Charles Ridgely of Maryland described the
"negotiations" between the bank and the state that placed the issue of
the bank's constitutionality before the state trial court, where a
"decision in favour of the state was there had by consent and the
appeal carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States.
'233
Johnson could presumably, had he chosen to do so, have
expressed some of the same reservations about the nature of the
M'Culloch litigation that he had voiced when he complained about
"feigned cases" in his concurring opinion in Fletcher. The Second Bank
was highly unpopular at the time, as the Panic of 1819 deepened into
a depression that would affect the lives of one-third of the U.S.
population. Many blamed the bank for exacerbating, if not causing,
these problems. Moreover, extensive corruption and mismanagement
in the bank had been documented by a special committee of the House
of Representatives in a report filed in January 1819. The report led
William Duane, editor of one of the most widely circulated newspapers
at the time, the Aurora, to declare that the bank was a "fetid and
monstrous abortion of private avarice, and political prostitution."
234
It would have been easy for Johnson to accept implied powers
in M'Culloch, even as he expressed reservations about the nature of
the case and the institution it embraced. The Johnson who attacked
Pinkney the following March in The Amiable Isabella presumably
would have done so. But the Johnson who joined Marshall's opinions
in M'Culloch and Cohens did not. Nor did he express any reservations
in his Osborn dissent about those aspects of the Marshall opinion that
reiterated prior principles. Indeed, if anything, he expanded on them
233. C. Ridgely, Executive Communication to the Legislature, MD. GAZETTE & POL.
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 17, 1818, at 3. M'Culloch was not, however, as one scholar has maintained,
an " 'amicable controversy.' " RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM: MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND AND THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 72 (2007)
(quoting NAT'L MESSENGER, Dec. 21, 1818). Rather, it was fully contested by both sides over nine
days of intense and high -quality argument before the Court. See KILLENBECK, M'CULLOCH,
supra note 145, at 95-109 (summarizing the arguments).
234. Brutus, Bank of the United States, No. XIII, WKLY. AURORA (Phila.), Jan. 11, 1819, at
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there and in Gibbons. And in the internal improvement debate, he
argued vigorously, albeit behind the scenes, for an even more
sweeping vision of national power.
Johnson's silence in key Marshall Court decisions came at a
particularly crucial moment for the Court, one in which the political
capital it had built up was arguably at risk as it protected the hated
bank and, time and again, imposed limits on state authority. Johnson
eventually declared "enough" in Osborn and Planter's Bank on the
jurisdictional front. He refused to do so, however, on implied powers.
Morgan speculates that Johnson's motives in at least one area,
internal improvement, may have been less than pure, given his
personal support for and stake in some such projects. 235 That does not,
however, explain why Johnson would base many of his arguments in
favor of implied powers and federal exclusivity on the need to counter
the destabilizing tendencies of the states.
The proper question, therefore, is not whether William Johnson
could or should have become a leader on the Marshall Court, rallying
other Justices to his side in a crusade against Marshall's practices and
nationalism. It would have been sufficient, given the stakes and the
tenor of the times, for Johnson simply to speak, breaking the united
front that otherwise prevailed. He did not, contrary to some accounts,
remain silent and cowed during the period in question. His diatribe
over The Amiable Isabella attests to that, and, in the wake of Gibbons
and Osborn, he would write twenty-three of the forty-eight separate
opinions that flowed from his pen during his tenure on the Court. This
was indeed a judicial dog with a considerable bark. But his refusal to
exercise it at key moments during his tenure on the Court is telling
and important.
235. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 124.
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